RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

JACK CARTER FUSON, Lieutenant General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 23 November 1920, St. Joseph, Missouri

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE: Over 35 years

DATE OF RETIREMENT: 1 August 1977

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

The Transportation School, Advanced Course
The Command and General Staff College
The Armed Forces Staff College
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

EDUCATIONAL DEGREE

University of Maryland - BS Degree - Military Studies

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (Last 10 Years)

F ROM	TO	ASSIGNMENTS
Jun 66	Jun 67	CO, 4th Trans Cmd, USARV
Jul 67	Aug 69	Dir of Transportation, DCSLOG, DA
Aug 69	Jul 70	A/DCSLOG (Doctrine Readiness), ACSLOG, DA
Aug 70	Jan 72	DCSLOG, USARPAC
Jan 72	Dec 72	J-4, MACV, USARV
Jan 73	Aug 75	CG, Fort Eustis
Sep 75	Jul 77	DCSLOG, DA

PROMOTIONS: **DATES OF APPOINTMENT**

2LT	19 Feb 42
lLT	8 Aug 42
CPT	13 May 43
MAJ	26 Feb 45
LTC	7 Jul 51
COL	16 Mar 62
BG	18 Aug 67
MG	1 Sep 69
LTG	1 Sep 75

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Legion of Merit w/5 Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal w/2 Oak Leaf Clusters
Army Commendation Medal w/Oak Leaf Cluster
Purple Heart

SOURCE OF COMMISSION ROTC (Missouri Military Academy)

INTERVIEW ABSTRACT

Interview with **Lieutenant General (Ret) Jack C. Fuson**

Lieutenant General (Ret) Jack C. Fuson entered the active Army through ROTC in 1942. He related his thoughts on key transportation issues to CPT William Moroz on 23 Jan 1985.

Concerning amphibious operations, General Fuson pointed out the lack of capability the Army possesses to set up amphibious operations in a hostile environment, and the limited ability of the primary service responsible, the Marine Corps, to do so. He stressed the need for today's military to address this lack of preparedness through planning, development of equipment, and proper training.

Another area needing improvement is cargo identification throughout transit from origin to destination. Citing the tremendous waste seen in Korea and Vietnam, General Fuson pointed out that cargo visibility is vital to prevent build-up and loss of supplies at ports and depots in an area of operation.

Finally, General Fuson addressed the differences seen in transportation management in a peacetime environment as opposed to war. In peacetime, both shipper and transporter agree that the "fill and down" concept of cargo movement is the best, both financially and in the utilization of assets. In wartime, however, the consumer and transporter become opposed over the implementation of this doctrine. The user wants his cargo shipped, no matter what the transport utilization, while the transporter must plan for the use of his assets. There must be a responsible organization tasked with prioritizing and implementing shipping guidelines, ensuring proper utilization and prioritizing of cargo.

This is the U.S. Army Transportation Oral History Program interview with Lieutenant General (Ret) Jack C. Fuson, conducted by Captain William C. Moroz at General Fuson's home in Ware Neck, Virginia.

LTG Fuson: First let me express my appreciation to MG Aaron L. Lilley, Jr., for asking me to participate in the Army Transportation Oral History Program. Also, let me express congratulations to General Lilley for initiating this program. I hope the program will be successful and helpful for all those to follow. I would like to address three or four topics. These are areas concerning Army logistics, in general, and transportation, in particular, in which I might be able to make a meaningful contribution. These are areas in which I believe I am uniquely qualified, based upon my 35 years of experience in the field, to describe problem areas not well understood by the Army. I hope that these lessons learned by m will be helpful not only to the Transportation School and the students of

the Advanced Course but also to the logistics officers, in general, and transportation officers, in particular.

The first area is The Army's Current Concept, Doctrine, and Know-How Concerning Amphibious Operations. Current joint doctrine and war plans visualize deployment of Army troops in support of contingency plans to be accomplished administratively only. Army units would move by surface and/or air transportation to the objective area and be loaded/unloaded administratively by support units pre-deployed similar to the way troops are handled during REFORGER [Return of Forces to Germany] exercises to Europe today. If there is to be combat landings involved, joint plans call for this to be accomplished by the Naval and Marine Corps amphibious forces. This is similar to the way we began World War II. It was visualized then, as now, that if Army units had to be combat-landed, they would use Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, and so forth. It was soon realized that this was not satisfactory. During World War II, the Marine Corps had a total of six divisions. The Army had some 82 divisions involved in amphibious operations at some time or another. Even more difficult was the fact that the two services operate under different conditions with different missions thus requiring different concepts, doctrine, and know-how.

It was early in World War II that the Army leadership realized that in order to successfully carry the war to the Germans, the Japanese, and the Italians, amphibious operations were absolutely essential. The Marine Corps traditionally is manned, equipped, and trained to go ashore, fight or occupy the lodgment area for approximately 30 days, and then backload and return to the near shore for re-equipping and retraining. The Army, on the other hand, has had in the past and will continue to have in the future, the mission of landing in an objective area and thereafter building a line of communication [LOC] to support land forces until enemy forces have been defeated. Missions are entirely different; the support necessary is entirely different. There have been a few exceptions. The latest one being when the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force [MAF] was required to land in the Da Nang area in Vietnam, establish a base, and thereafter remain and support operations as normally done by the Army.

CPT Moroz: General Fuson, would you explain the MAF operations in Da Nang?

LTG Fuson: In this case, the Marines of course were not equipped, trained, or capable of establishing a communications zone to support their combat units and the various necessary support units. So the decision was made at the highest level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the objections of the Marine Corps and the Navy, for the Navy to develop the logistic organization to do this job in the Da Nang area. As I say, this was an exception to normal operating doctrine. Thus, it's difficult to imagine if the United States were to become involved in a war of any size in the future that only the Marine Corps would be used for this purpose. The Army would have to be used also as was done in World War II. Thus, the problem. The Army has no capability, no concept, no doctrine, no training, no unit equipment, no organizations to carry out these terribly difficult operations under combat conditions.

The closest organizations having such capability are the Transportation Corps logistics-over-the-shore [LOTS] units. These units are equipped and trained to unload and move cargo. They are not organized, equipped, and trained to develop lodgment areas and to satisfy all the associated engineering requirements. The Army does not visualize the following:

1) marrying up the LOTS units with the combat units to assist in preparations for combat unit loading and subsequent deployment;

2) unload over unfriendly beaches under combat conditions; and,

3) even more difficult, assist in the development of the lodgment area and in the logistics support under such conditions until normal re-supply can be established.

I understand that the Army has neither the funds nor the desire to correct the situation today. It's not approved joint doctrine.

However, if a war should occur, the Transportation Corps would be called upon, in all probability, to do the same thing that was required of the Corps of Engineers in World War II. They were called upon to establish the Engineer Amphibious Command and the subsequent Engineer boat and shore regiments. I therefore recommend that the Transportation Museum, in conjunction with the Transportation School, acquire as much historical information as possible on the Engineer Amphibious Command and its Engineer boat and shore regiments of World War II (the manuals, the doctrine, the organizational information, training literature, training experience). Get and store all the World War II history of how it was prepared and actually accomplished. It would certainly be wise to update such information to be consistent with current automated Army supply, maintenance, and transportation doctrine. I'm sure the Army doesn't believe the need exists; consequently, filing all of the above information in the Transportation Museum would at least place it in a central location so that it would be available when and if the need should ever arise. Looking back on our experience in World War II, of the difficulty in learning what and how to accomplish this mission and what equipment needed and realizing that this is a very time-consuming job, slow, and costly. I do believe that filing everything available in one central location today would be wise for the Transportation Corps and the Army.

CPT Moroz: General Fuson, in addition to this documentation, where would the funding for such amphibious upgrading come from?

LTG Fuson: Well, that's the reason I say that I'm sure the Army does not want to fund it. However, I don't believe it would cost an exorbitant amount for the Transportation Museum, with help from the School, to gather this material. They could go through files (the Engineer Library in Belvoir, World War II history in the library at the Pentagon and the Army War College, and various other sources) to acquire and then file this information away here where they would be accessible when and if needed. I believe that the Transportation Center could afford to do that.

CPT Moroz: Would it take a blue-ribbon group from the different services to decide just who does what?

LTG Fuson: Now you're getting into missions and functions of the services, and that's far above what I'm visualizing as practical today. They wouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole. The current doctrine is based upon the fact that the Navy and the Marine Corps do not want to fund additional amphibious shipping and capability, as the Air Force does not care to fund additional air transport over the current requirements. While I was still on active duty, I wrote several letters to the J-4, LTG Oran E. DeHaven, pointing out this problem. He attempted to do something at the joint level. Because of the dollars involved and what the services considered to be are important missions, the current doctrine will remain, at least during peacetime, as it is.

CPT Moroz: General Fuson, would you comment on the next topic, supply Distribution versus transportation operation in a Theater of Operations or in combat.

LTG Fuson: Yes, indeed. I would be delighted. Throughout my transportation experience, both in the Transportation School and in Transportation units in the Pacific and in Europe, and during support of combat operations in Korea and in Vietnam, I was taught and observed the importance of port and beach clearance in overseas line of communication operations, especially in support of combat units. However, I was not taught the basic fundamental problem, and the transportation responsibility in solving, or at least lessening, the problem, of the essentiality of asset visibility in transit, origin to destination. Asset visibility is the knowledge of what is in the package being transported. This I learned by experience, but still don't believe it's well understood by most logisticians and transporters. I'll use the Korean War and the Vietnamese War as examples to explain the problems.

During both wars, thousands of tons of critical cargo and supplies representing millions of dollars were lost, destroyed, or not used for the purpose intended. The cargo and supplies were lost to the system in transit or misplaced due to inadequate asset visibility in transit and/or each theater reception area. In each case, the port operator would blame the receiving customer for not knowing what he had received. The receiving customer would always blame the port operator for delivering items to him with insufficient documentation for him to accurately receive, inventory, and pick them up on his files, and so forth. As a result, thousands and thousands of critical supplies were never used for the purpose intended. Let me use as the first example the Korean War. During the Korean War, Army logistics was provided by the Technical Service System. Ordnance, for example, the largest of the seven technical services, had the mission of providing supply and maintenance for most of the big-dollar items - the tanks, the trucks, the guns, the ammunition, and so forth. The bulk of supplies and equipment moved into Korea came through the port of Pusan [Korea] for each of the tech services.

During the last two years of the war, the United States moved in an excessive amount of tonnage. This was during a period in which the United States was attempting to build up to the maximum before what it thought would be a peace settlement, after which it

would no longer be permitted to move in tonnage. The port of Pusan at its peak was handling over a million tons of cargo a month, a good sized operation anywhere. In order to handle this, each tech service had a large depot in the Pusan area in which to receive the cargoes for which they had responsibility. The Ordnance Depot operated what they called the Ordnance Base Depot Number 1 [OBD 1] very close to the port of Pusan. It had facilities for receiving cargo from the port by highway transportation, barge transportation, and rail transportation (most unusual capability). It received the bulk of the cargo via highway and barge and utilized its rail tracks for shipping north.

The system for identifying and handling cargo at the time was very cumbersome (the documentation that was used). It was based upon marrying up the appropriate bills of lading, and the various form of documentation required, for each shipment of cargo at the end of ship's tackle. Then, supposedly, a receiving customer could properly receive and identify and then stock, store, or issue the appropriate items. As I say, it was a very laborious and time-consuming system. As the quantity of cargo and supplies increased, the system became nearly impossible to operate. The transporter felt that it was the customer's responsibility to have the know-how and the capability to receive the cargo and do his job regardless of how the transporter turned it over to him. At the time, all cargo was color-coded so that the transporter could move ordnance supplies, coded with red, to the Ordnance Depot and quartermaster supplies, coded with yellow, to the Quartermaster Depot. This system did not adequately permit the receiver to pick up and properly identify the cargo.

The volume of cargo became so large that it was truly impossible for the depot to have sufficient manpower to even unload the transportation, let alone identify the cargo. So the transporter would not only deliver by truck or barge, but he would bring along cranes and use them to dump the cargo in the depot without regard for asset identification. The result was truly disastrous but not generally recognized as such by the Army leadership. The Ordnance Depot was the worst. Everyone in the business realized that sufficient ordnance supplies had discharged and moved to OBD 1 to support all of the United States and Republic of Korea Divisions in Korea for 60-90 days. However, because the pile of supplies was such a mess, depot personnel had to move away, establish a new depot, and re-requisition all of these supplies. When one considers the tremendous amount of critical supplies piled up and the millions of dollars represented by the pile, it is truly appalling.

CPT Moroz: Didn't the terrain in Korea and lack of warehouses add to this problem?

LTG Fuson: The terrain in the Pusan area was no problem. The terrain is flat. Lack of warehouses was part of the problem. Lack of adequate personnel was part of the problem. However, the biggest problem was the lack of asset visibility as cargo moved through the transportation system to the customer so that the customer could pick it up. In Vietnam, we had exactly the same problem. I was personally involved in this also and speak from experience. We did the sane thing to the Fish Market Depot in the Saigon area and the Long Binh Depot in Vietnam as we had done to the various tech service depots in Korea. Everybody's heard of the gray boxes that we moved back and forth

from Vietnam to Okinawa. The boxes were full of unidentified items, which had to be moved back to Okinawa, re-identified, put back into usable condition, and shipped back to Vietnam, generally to be lost again because of the same problem.

CPT Moroz: Was this problem identified as well in the Push-Package System employed in Vietnam?

LTG Fuson: The push packages received a lot of criticism because they contributed to this problem, but they were not the major problem. During the early stages of a war, it's difficult for the combat units to really know and requisition what they require. Even today, the war reserves are divided into push packages to be pushed in early so that supplies are available. When you lose the asset visibility, you develop the gray-box problem. It was said that the Transportation people caused the problem. I must say that they were a large contributor. In Vietnam, for example, I personally was told, through channels down from the President of the United States, to unload the ships regardless of conditions in the port. At the time, we had over 200 ships laying off Vung Tau loaded with both military and US civilian-aide cargo. There was no adequate place to clear it, with inadequate personnel to receive, identify, and thereafter use it appropriately. However, unloading and losing the cargo was not the proper solution.

CPT Moroz: Was there also a lack of deep-water berths?

LTG Fuson: That was not the problem. We unloaded the ships as we were told. We solved the port problem. We unloaded and cleared the cargo and, of necessity, moved cranes to the depot areas and even unloaded trucks by dumping the cargo in the depot. We did the same with US-aid customers. Unfortunately, we made little or no attempt to marry up the proper documentation with the cargo so that customers had at least a fighting chance of identifying and picking it up on their records for subsequent issue.

CPT Moroz: Did changing from a manual to an automated system in 1966-68 add to this problem?

LTG Fuson: It didn't add to the problem, but automation wasn't sufficiently advanced to be of much help. It still, to this day, is not as it should be. The Fish Market and Long Binh Depots looked like OBD 1 in Pusan during the Korean War. It was so bad that the combat divisions established their own re-supply system. They created what they called expediters. Each division would assign 15 or 20 supply personnel back in the first logistic depots at Long Binh and/or the Fish Market. When the divisions needed a certain repair part or a component, rather than going through the automated supply system which was pretty inadequate, they would telephone their expediters and tell them to look for the particular part. Expeditors would move through the depots kicking boxes and examining items until they found what they were looking for, thereafter moving it out of the depot back to the division.

CPT Moroz: In other words, in many cases items would be ordered and reordered, even from CONUS [Continental United States], and the items could have been in country all along?

LTG Fuson: They were in country all along, but they couldn't be identified. When the backlog became unmanageable, the items would then be moved back to Okinawa. There an expensive special operation was established with long lines of Army Materiel Command [AMC] personnel assisting in opening boxes and identifying, repairing, repackaging, re-documenting, and reshipping items back to Vietnam.

CPT Moroz: General Fuson, would you like to summarize that last point?

LTG Fuson: I think the main thing is the system didn't and still doesn't work well under these conditions. The transportation officer blames the supply personnel and the supply system, and the supply personnel blame the transportation personnel. I'll always remember listening to whom I consider to be my No. 1 teacher in stevedore operations, COL Buck Bratcher. This was during the Korean War. We would unload cargo and push it to the depots, and I asked the question, "Shouldn't we do a better job of identifying this stuff before we shove it down their throats?" COL Bratcher's answer was always, "They ordered this stuff; give it to them; let them identify it." I think that describes the feeling of most transportation port operators I've known. I tend to agree more with the customer, the supply side. I think I did even during the Korean War. The transportation system must have complete and accurate asset visibility.

When we initially pick up the shipments, we have this information regardless of the system, regardless of the form. Somehow we have to maintain that asset visibility throughout the in-transit period for each shipment. We must tell the customer what's being delivered in sufficient detail for the customer to do his job under these oftentimes terribly, terribly crowded and difficult situations. This is especially true and important during the early days of a combat operation. The current state-of-the-art transportation-wise, communication-wise, and automation-wise does make it possible today to solve the problem.

My understanding is that we still haven't solved this problem nor have we convinced the people involved of their true responsibility in this area. Not only must the system be developed and fielded but also the transportation personnel must understand their responsibilities, be acutely aware of the customer's need, and realize the importance of asset visibility in transit. As I say, there is a lot of work going on today, but I believe a lot more needs to be done. I merely cite one example that the Army might use to assist in resolving this problem: The American President Line currently has a system of moving supplies from Japan to New York via ship, rail, and so forth. They have 100 percent asset visibility by item throughout the entire life of the movement. It's so accurate that Macy's in New York can plan on receiving an item on a Friday and putting it on sale on Saturday because it knows precisely what's in each container. Maintaining asset visibility is possible, and I think it's terribly important the Army gets on with this job.

CPT Moroz: The next major topic is Transportation Management, Both in Peacetime and in War.

LTG Fuson: I would like to talk about this subject in some detail. First let me define the terms I intend using because different terms mean different things to different people. These definitions may not be as currently taught in the transportation School; if not, forgive me. It's the way I taught the subject in the Movements Branch of the Transportation School in the late 1940's and I've thought of them in that way ever since. There are three principal terms I want to define: transportation management, traffic management, and movement control.

In my mind, transportation management can apply to all areas of transportation. It can mean the management of the overall transportation system, the management of any node within the system, and/or the management of traffic moving over these nodes. It's a general term while traffic management and movement control are far more specific.

Traffic management, in my mind, is really a commercial term used by the industry. It means the rules, regulations, rate structures, and routing and service information pertaining to the movement of personnel and freight by commercial transportation. Each group of carriers and terminals has its traffic guide that indicates routes, rates, special instructions, and so forth. It's the basis upon which the groups charge and collect fees. In the military, traffic management to me means deciding what node or means is best suited to satisfy a military movement based first on cost and second on getting the job done. This is so because in peacetime cost is the main consideration. Consequently, the military must use and live by the term "traffic management" in peacetime, particularly here in the Continental United States. In wartime , the situation becomes different.

Historically, we generally replace the term "traffic management" with the term "movement control." They both include detail planning and programming of movements, especially movement control. Movement control in my way of thinking is the balancing of requirements against capabilities when capabilities are in short supply in a wartime situation. This must be a command decision at the highest level. The term "movement control" was copied from the British in World War II. It was developed to a very high state of effectiveness during the later stages of the war.

The communications zone [COMMZ] under MG [later LTG] John C. H. Lee was the major logistics command in Europe and had the mission of logistically supporting all of our forces. This command would prepare a monthly movement program in which all requirements for movement received from customers were allocated to the various modes of transportation. If a customer wanted something moved, he had to forecast the need in order to be assured of its subsequent movement. Although this was done on a monthly basis, there were, of course, daily changes based upon the tactical situation and the need of the service. When changes occurred, they had to be very, very specifically justified.

As I read history, MG Lee personally observed this very closely. Since World War II, the U.S. Army in Europe has tried to follow this procedure but has been unable to. Because there is adequate transportation as there always is in peacetime, no need exists for balancing requirements against available transportation modes. The Army has tried to develop a wartime movement program, but here again, because of the lack of understanding and appreciation at all levels, customers are not prepared to submit the detailed requirements for movement that are so necessary in movement control planning and programming. During a war this would all change, and we would immediately have to be back into the movement control planning and programming process.

We attempted to implement this system in Vietnam. We established the Transportation Movement Agency [TMA] at the Military Assistance Command Vietnam [MACV] level. Trained here at Fort Eustis, the 594th Movement Control Group was moved to Vietnam to provide this service. They worked directly for Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam [COMUS MACV] under the direct supervision of the Director of Logistics. Because there really wasn't a critical shortage of transportation in Vietnam, TMA was not given the necessary clout to do the job. As a result, each of the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) developed its own movement control agency to handle balancing requirements against capabilities for movements in country. As I say, planning and programming of movements does apply to both traffic management and movement control. It is especially applicable to movement control in time of war.

There are also those who believe that we really need not waste a lot of time in peacetime planning transportation for war, which would involve following a rather tedious procedure. They believe that the only difference in war-time is the volume of movement and that without great difficulty industry can crank up to met the need, except maybe in a theater of operation. In my opinion, that's totally wrong, and I am constantly appalled at the number of senior people who think this way. As I talk with General Accounting Office [GAO] auditors who constantly work in this area, this seems to be their stock answer. They say there's plenty of transportation so why worry in peacetime about planning for it during mobilization.

Well, in peacetime, a great deal exists between the customer and the transportation manager. Each tries hard to work closely with the other. The reason for this, as I indicated before, is dollars. The customer wants to move his requirements at the cheapest rate possible, and the carrier wants business; so cooperation exists. There is nearly always adequate transportation as long as the price is right in peacetime. When an emergency arises, this all changes. The customer no longer cares about dollars. His only thought is getting his commodity, his supplies, to the right place at the right time and in usable condition. He could care less about transportation "full and down" loading (no loss of cargo space).

The transportation manager, on the other hand, is interested in the most effective and efficient way of managing this terribly scarce item -- transportation. There never is enough transportation during an emergency. It's always the first shortage to appear, and

the transportation manager is judged completely on how he manages this very scarce and all-important commodity. Consequently, the relationship between the customer and the transporter in times of an emergency is one of constant conflict and adversarial rather than cooperation. Immediately a requirement exists for an arbitrator, a referee, to oversee daily arguments at the highest level. A review of World War II history soon makes this need apparent.

In my opinion, one of the best descriptions of these various World War II logistic problems is in one of the official U.S. Army histories of World War II entitled, Sinews of War. It describes in great detail the problems in the U.S. Army Service Forces between the Director of Supply, [MG LeRoy Lutes], and the Chief of Transportation, [MG Charles P. Gross]. The U.S. Army Service Forces organization was established to manage and command the tech services in providing logistic support to the Army and the Army Air Corps during World War II. Both men speak of the problem of balancing requirements against capabilities. MG Lutes was constantly hammering that things had to move regardless of "full and down" loading, and, of course, MG Gross was talking "full and down" loading only. Almost daily, they would have to go before the Commander of the Army Service Forces, LTG Somervell. who had to personally make these kinds of decisions.

This type of decision-making is a wartime job, as I have said, and is not needed in peacetime. In the Army in the field -- the corps and divisions -- this ends up being a command responsibility. Although he delegates this to the maximum to his director of logistics, in the final analysis the commander makes these kinds of decisions, as he makes all of his command decisions. This really doesn't present a problem. However, above the Army in the field -- the joint and combined areas -- the problem of balancing requirements against capabilities becomes far more difficult. In fact, this is much more difficult than it was in World War II. As I've discussed, in World War II, the customers moving things overseas were all under the Chief of Staff of the Army, and he had an Army Service Force commander who had the authority to make these kinds of decisions. Under our current joint force, this is not the case. This is really the point I want to talk about.

Who's responsible for making these critical decisions at the various levels above the Army in the field, at the national level -- Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], and the joint and combined theaters? Well, a detailed review indicates that no one is in charge. Again, there isn't a requirement in peacetime because there is adequate transportation, and we use the commercial carrier system to run things. We have the three Transportation Operating Agencies [TOAs] -- Military Airlift Command [MAC], Military Sealift Command [MSC], and Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC] - that either provide or arrange for commercial transportation whether it be land, sea, or air.

Should a war come, we'll have an entirely different problem. There is not adequate transportation for defense needs, let alone for satisfying the country's economy. Who is going to determine the priorities for movement between the country's economy and the

military? Who is going to determine the priorities for movement within the country's economy and within defense? Who's going to move first, second, and third? We haven't had this problem since World War II, but during World War II we established a system to satisfy this need.

A review of history shows that President Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II established several organizations at the highest level: The War Shipping Administration, the Munitions Board, and so forth. These organizations worked directly for him, constantly reviewing and balancing requirements against capabilities, not only in transportation but also in all scarce resources. This would have to be done again, but it does not come easily because there are many groups who do not want someone in charge. This is especially true with the military.

This has been very obvious in all of the recent mobilization exercises [MOBEXsl conducted at the national level. MOBEX 72, 80, and 82 all pointed out this problem. As a result of MOBEX 72 and 80, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of the Joint Deployment Agency [JDA]. The specific mission of this agency would be to satisfy and accomplish balancing requirements against capabilities, initially for troop deployment and subsequently for other support supplies and equipment, between the services who are all fighting for their share. As I will mention later, this agency was not given and has not been given adequate authority to do its job.

The current administration established a Wartime Planning Agency as soon as it took over in 1981. President Ronald W. Reagan signed the letter establishing the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board [EMPB], which consists of the head or the deputy head of the 11 major government agencies including the Department of Defense [DOD]. They have organized into 12 working groups, all designed to get a handle on wartime mobilization planning, including transportation. OSD established a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy to coordinate DOD mobilization planning, a rest difficult job. General Joseph Stilwell was brought in as his deputy to work full time in this area. Being the workaholic he is, he has devoted more than 12 hours a day ever since attempting to do just this. It covers all areas where there can be an argument about who gets what and who gets it when.

Transportation is especially important because, as I have said, it's the first shortage to occur in all emergency situations. People and things must be moved to the correct location before corrective action, whatever that might be, can occur. I mentioned that it was accomplished in World War II, but the problem is far are difficult today because of the way OSD and the joint staff are organized.

Logistics is a service responsibility. In most logistic areas, joint and/or combined situations have little effect on operations, but transportation is unique. It cannot be a service responsibility. Each service cannot afford its own transportation system; our country has only one - our commercial transportation system. Of all the logistic functions, transportation is truly the most joint.

Consequently, when push comes to shove during mobilization and subsequently, someone must decide whether the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force gets priority for movement, such as which units go overseas on MAC airlift to Europe first. The system now calls for the decision to be made initially by the Joint Deployment Agency, an agency working directly for the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]. Anyone reviewing this agency's action to date, even though it was directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to be the decision maker, can see that it has the same problem as the joint staff. The problem is mentioned annually by Congress and the Administration; the problem was mentioned by the last Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army prior to their retirement. For the first time in history, General David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to his retirement, went public with a paper indicating the need for an additional position for someone to be in charge of the joint staff rather than there just being four positions. When a situation arises where one service has to defer to another, the four cannot agree, thus no action is taken.

General Edward C. Myer, the last Chief of Staff of the Army to retire was even stronger in his criticism. He said that something had to be done so that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had someone in charge to tell the Joint Deployment Agency that it had the authority to make decisions regarding planning and programming transportation assets. This has not happened to date because the people in Congress and the Administration who do not want someone in charge of the military outnumber those who do.

The people opposed keep talking about The Seven days in May problem, the joint German general staff, the general on the white charger, the fear of a military taking over the government. Although this seems an absolutely remote possibly given our 200 year history, many people hold this feeling.

I read in the paper yesterday that there is now a high-powered committee working for certain congressmen that will recommend changes similar to those recommended by General Jones and General Myer. How this all comes out, time will tell. Time really doesn't permit me to discuss this problem in sufficient detail nor is such an in-depth discussion appropriate for the purpose of the interview.

It is the basic problem to explore. The fact is that there is no one in charge, come a war, to make these terribly important decisions at the highest level, to approve the balancing of requirements against capabilities that's necessary in movement control. This is reflected down through the joint level until it reaches the services. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], the combined area, the same problem is intensified because NATO and the 15 countries believe logistics is a national responsibility. Here again, transportation cannot be a national responsibility.

CPT Moroz: General Fuson, please sum up.

LTG Fuson: In summary of this third point, I would just repeat that transportation management during and subsequent to mobilization is a major problem for all the

reasons I've stated. Because it's a terribly strong political issue, the problem probably won't be solved in peacetime for the reasons I indicated. To me, I think it's a terrible lack of effectiveness, efficiency, and so forth, that our country doesn't have a plan for how to organize and how to operate in wartime or during an emergency. I do understand now that the OSD mobilization planning group working directly under General Stilwell is attempting to develop such a mobilization plan. Waiting for a war to start to do a major reorganization with the resulting procedures and so forth probably won't get the job done next time as it has in the past. At least we should have a plan and, of course, transportation is one of the key elements that should be included. I strongly suggest that all students of transportation at every opportunity push for this.